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Artwork Completion: A Response to Gover
Let a revision invitation scenario be a case in which a particular possibility becomes salient to an
artist, namely that she could make significant changes to her work. Let an artist have a
refrainment disposition with respect to her work just in case the artist is disposed to refrain from
making significant changes to her work in revision invitation scenarios. Let a completion
disposition be a refrainment disposition that is grounded in certain cognitive mechanisms,
specifically rational capacities of the artist consisting of various beliefs, desires, and further
cognitive dispositions. In “The Complete Work” we set out and defend a view of artwork
completion, the disposition view: an artwork is complete just in case the artist who created the
work has acquired a completion disposition with respect to her work. We read Gover as
posing six objections to the disposition view. Below we reconstruct the objections and
respond to each of them.
Objection 1: the disposition view collapses into the judgment view.
Rationale: while there are different versions of the judgment view of artwork completion,
they all agree that an artwork is complete only if the artist who created the work has made a
completion judgment about her work – she has judged that her work is complete. The
disposition view is wrongly presented as an alternative to the judgment view. Completion
judgments aren’t supposed to be necessary for artwork completion on the disposition view,
yet an artist has a completion disposition with respect to her work only if she has made a
completion judgment about her work.
Response: completion judgments aren’t necessary for the acquisition of completion
dispositions. Suppose that an artist is sympathetic to art-theoretical skepticism about work
completion – when asked about her views on artwork completion in general she says that all
artistic activity is “necessarily incomplete” and “always already endless.” Suppose that she
nevertheless acquires a completion disposition with respect to one of her artworks. This
disposition we will suppose results in part from thoughts about the work’s features (for
example, she imaginatively compares the perceived features of the work to possible changes
that come to mind, and senses that the piece would be best left alone). The psychological
equilibrium she reaches in this case doesn’t involve an occurrent belief to the effect that her
work is complete, as she never has occurrent beliefs with this content. Since the artist judges
that her work is complete only if she has an occurrent belief to the effect that the work is
complete, in this case she doesn’t make a completion judgment with respect to her work.
(And, speaking of the occurrent/dispositional distinction with respect to beliefs, it seems
that the artist doesn’t have a dispositional belief to the effect that her work is complete
either.)
Objection 2: the disposition view is viciously circular.
Rationale: according to the disposition view, an artwork is complete just in case the artist is
disposed to treat the work as complete, and for the artist to be disposed to treat the work as
complete is just for her to treat the work as being complete.

Response: this isn’t an accurate reconstruction of the disposition view. In particular, this
gloss of the view doesn’t capture the notion of a completion disposition as we present it in
the paper. Moreover, it’s unclear that this gloss of the view is viciously circular in any case.
Let the simple view be the following: for an artwork to be complete is for the artist to treat the
work as being complete. While we don’t endorse the simple view, it isn’t to be rejected on
the grounds that it’s circular provided that the notion of treating a work as being complete is
understood independently of the notion of a work being complete.
Objection 3: the disposition view requires that, for any complete work, there is a precise
moment at which it goes from being incomplete to being complete, yet it seems that there is
no such moment.
Rationale: a consequence of the disposition view is this: in the Géricault case there was a
precise moment at which The Raft went from being an incomplete work to a complete work
– the exact moment Géricault acquired a completion disposition with respect to The Raft. It
seems, however, that there was no such moment.
Response: many predicates are vague. Plausibly, ‘being a complete artwork’ is such a
predicate. That is to say, it seems that there are borderline cases for this predicate, cases in
which it neither applies nor fails to apply. And if ‘being a complete artwork’ is vague then
there is no precise moment at which The Raft went from being incomplete to complete.
Note, however, that the disposition view is compatible with ‘being a complete artwork’ being
vague, provided that ‘acquired a completion disposition with respect to her work’ is vague as
well. And it’s independently plausible to think that the latter predicate is vague, as many (all?)
psychological predicates are vague.
Objection 4: the disposition view makes incorrect property attributions.
Rationale: when a work is complete, this is because the artist who created the work has
certain features, not because the artwork itself has a particular property, viz. what the
disposition view identifies as the property of being complete.
Response: we agree that an artwork is complete only if the artist who created the work has
come to have certain features. But we also think that when the artist comes to have the
relevant features (when she acquires a completion disposition with respect to her work), the
fact that she has these features grounds the fact that the work itself has a certain feature,
namely the property of being complete.
Objection 5: the disposition view includes an implicit, second ‘no-going-back’ condition: if
the artist has acquired a completion disposition with regard to a particular work, that work is
irrevocably complete, even if the artist subsequently loses the completion disposition with
regard to this very work. The disposition view so understood, however, is subject to
counterexamples.
Rationale: a completion disposition, like any psychological disposition, can be acquired and
then lost. With this in mind, one way of understanding the Géricault case is as follows: (i)
Géricault acquired a completion disposition with respect to his work and when he did so his
work went from being incomplete to complete, (ii) later he lost this disposition and when he
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did so his work went from being complete to incomplete, and (iii) still later he gained a
completion disposition with respect to his work and when he did so again his work went
from being incomplete to complete. Perhaps this isn’t how the Géricault case actually
unfolded, but if such a case is possible then the disposition view supplemented with the nogoing-back condition is false.
Response: we don’t see the no-going-back considerations as amounting to a separate
condition. Instead, our discussion of this issue was intended to simply clarify what
consequences the disposition view has. The disposition view says that an artwork is
complete just in case the artist who created the work has acquired a completion disposition
with respect to her work. If the artist loses her completion disposition with respect to her
work, it will still be true that she once had a completion disposition with respect to work.
Hence, the disposition view is compatible with the idea that an artwork is complete even if
the artist currently lacks a completion disposition with respect to her work. So, returning to
the potential counterexample described above, the disposition view does indeed have the
consequence that The Raft couldn’t have gone from being complete to being incomplete. But
we don’t see this as being problematic for the view. There are possible cases in which works
go from being incomplete to complete – this claim functions as a datum that any account of
artwork completion must accommodate. But the idea that there are possible cases in which
works go from being complete to incomplete doesn’t have the same status – it’s unclear that
such cases are possible (unless the work in question is destroyed or seriously damaged), so
it’s not a desideratum of a theory of artwork completion that it take this possibility into
account.
Objection 6: the disposition view has implausible epistemic consequences.
Rationale: whether an artist has a completion disposition can only be inferred from the
artist’s behavior. Hence, if an artwork is complete in virtue of the fact that the artist who
created it has a completion disposition with respect to her work then whether an artwork is
complete likewise can only be inferred from the artist’s behavior. But we can know that an
artwork is complete without making inferences that concern the artist’s behavior. To think
otherwise would have us knowing less about which artworks are complete than we in fact
do.
Response: we deny that you can know that an artwork is complete without making
inferences that concern the artist’s behavior. Note, however, that this doesn’t mean that you
know that an artwork is complete only if you’ve directly observed the artist’s relevant
behavior. In the case of poetry, for example, we often have ancillary material indicating that
the artist did behave in the relevant way. This material includes manuscripts, published texts,
and statements by the author or associates of the author from diaries, letters, and interviews.
We acknowledge, however, that often we do not know what we would like to know about
artists and their works. But it is better to recognize our uncertainty than to indulge in wishful
thinking.
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